From Energy Governance to Data Sovereignty: Taiwan's Strategic Crossroads

Energy is not just about electricity is a question of national governance philosophy―and survival strategy.

At the intersection of Taiwan's energy and technology policy, James Wu stands out as a rare thinker capable of placing "energy governance," "AI data centers," and "national strategy" on the same conceptual map.

He speaks slowly, calmly, with the composure and precision of a systems engineer. When discussing energy transition and data sovereignty, his tone resembles that of someone unravelling a vast and intricate network—from contradictions within government agencies, to the strategic value of subsea cables, to the renewable-energy binding of AI data centers.

"Energy is not just about electricity," he says. "It is a question of national governance philosophy—and long-tern development strategy."

From "Managing Power and Water" to Energy Governance: The Institutional Time Lag

Wu noted that during Taiwan's era of rapid economic growth, society broadly regarded energy as a basic public service—as long as the government ensured stable supplies of electricity and water, it was seen as delivering results. "The thinking of that time was to treat energy purely as a fundamental requirement for people's livelihoods and industrial development, not as a strategic asset," he said.

Beginning with the export-processing zones of the 1960s that laid the foundation for the electronics sector, Taiwan shifted from labor-intensive to technology-intensive industries by the 1980s as semiconductors and information technology took off. Energy consumption surged in tandem. "Back then, no one imagined energy would become part of a national security agenda," Wu remarked. "Today, Taiwan consumes roughly 290 billion kWh annually. Both total electricity consumption and per-capita usage rank among the highest in the world, yet our energy-governance framework has not kept pace."

Because Taiwan lacks natural resources and faces geographic constraints, its long-standing energy policies evolved under a paradigm of imported fuel dependence. But with technological progress in renewable energy accelerating rapidly over the past two decades, domestic large-scale energy production has suddenly become feasible. Countries around the world have begun shifting their strategic focus from safeguarding fuel imports to scaling up and efficiently utilizing renewables. Wu pointed to the United Kingdom—also an island nation—as an example: "In 2024, renewables accounted for 50 percent of the U.K.'s power generation, surpassing fossil fuels for the first time. This will likely become the norm."

Commenting on Taiwan's current governance structure, Wu argued that a fundamental problem lies in its "structural contradictions." The Energy Administration is housed under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), whose core mission is to promote economic growth—making a stable power supply a critical pillar. Yet global energy policy today is driven by the pursuit of energy transition and long-term sustainability. Although economic growth and energy transition ultimately aim for a shared outcome, the process is rife with tensions.

"When industrial demand for electricity is pressing, residential electricity rates must be kept stable, and the short-term cost of renewable development remains high, the MOEA inevitably has to choose between ‘industrial expansion' and ‘energy transition.' Unsurprisingly, energy policy ends up being adjusted to fit industrial policy," Wu said.

He believes Taiwan must move toward an independent energy-governance model—one in which the energy authority is no longer subordinate to the MOEA. To ensure energy policy can truly balance security and sustainability, the system must give energy governance a more autonomous institutional space, free from the constraints of short-term economic imperatives. "Many European and American countries have long treated energy as an independent governance domain because it intersects with industry, environmental protection, and even national defense. If Taiwan wants to carry out a genuine energy transition, it cannot simply patch holes within the existing structure—it must redefine the logic of energy governance."

He paused, then spoke with conviction: "Our problem today is not a lack of technology or capital. What we lack is an upgrade in governance. Only when energy, economic, and environmental authorities function with checks and balances—like a separation of powers—can policy become stable and predictable."

James Wu, Founder of Maximus Consulting

AI Data Centers and Renewable Energy: "They Must Be Hard-Bound"

One of the issues that has captured Wu's attention most recently is the mounting energy pressure brought by the rise of artificial intelligence. "AI data centers are not ordinary server farms—they are power-hungry beasts," he said bluntly. "A single large-scale AI data center can consume as much electricity as a medium-sized city."

The strategic purpose behind building these facilities is to strengthen national computing capacity, thereby enhancing Taiwan's global competitiveness in both digital capability and overall national power. But from an energy standpoint, increases in computing capacity are directly proportional to increases in power consumption. "If we talk about advancing human civilization through AI," Wu argued, "yet allow these data centers to run on coal and natural gas, it contradicts both sustainability principles and strategic logic."

He stressed that Taiwan's AI development and renewable-energy strategy must be planned in an integrated manner. "We cannot allow advanced AI systems to rely on traditional fossil-fuel power. Doing so would isolate us from global green-supply-chain standards."

Taiwan's current share of green energy remains just above 10 percent, while electricity supply in northern Taiwan is already under significant strain. With nuclear power being phased out, an inherent structural gap has emerged. "If AI data centers are to scale domestically, they must be tied to renewable-energy supply," Wu said. "Site selection, infrastructure planning, and financing models all need to be designed as an integrated system."

He therefore recommends that the government promote an "AI × Green Energy policy package," requiring all newly built data centers to include a designated share of renewable-energy investment or to secure power purchase agreements (PPAs) for green electricity. "If AI is the brain of the nation, then electricity is the nutrient that keeps that brain functioning—only green AI can be sustainably developed."

Wu cautioned against viewing energy purely as a cost. "Energy powers AI computation, and AI is the backbone of national competitiveness. The country that can efficiently use renewable energy to sustain AI will be the one to seize the initiative in the next global economic era."

To him, the issue extends far beyond technology—it's also a matter of sovereignty. "Data sovereignty and energy sovereignty are two sides of the same coin. If limitations in domestic power supply push critical AI computing capacity overseas, or if local AI data centers depend on imported fuels, then a portion of your national sovereignty is effectively placed in someone else's hands."

Energy is diplomacy in its own right. In Wu's view, Europe forges alliances through green energy, while the United States wields fossil fuels and LNG as instruments of strategic influence. Taiwan must craft its own narrative―one that integrates subsea cables, floating offshore wind, AI-driven green power, and data sovereignty into a unified Taiwan-centric New Energy Story.

From Subsea Cables to New-Energy Diplomacy: Strategic Visions for an Island Nation

Looking ahead, what excites Wu Yixiu most is Taiwan's emerging role in subsea cables and new-energy diplomacy.

Taking up a pen, he sketched a simple map. "Look—Taiwan's geographic position, situated between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, makes it a critical hub for both maritime electricity transmission and data flow."

For years, cross-border submarine cables were regarded solely as communications infrastructure. Today, however, advances in high-voltage direct current (HVDC) technology allow these same cables to transmit electricity across long distances. "A single 2-GW subsea cable, operating at full capacity, could deliver the equivalent of about 5 to 6 percent of Taiwan's annual electricity consumption. It would expand our baseload portfolio while giving additional momentum to renewable-energy development."

Wu elaborated further: "By connecting two electricity markets through subsea cables, we can instantly balance the intermittency inherent in renewable generation, improving economic efficiency and enhancing energy security. These cables would transform Taiwan from a closed and isolated grid into one that is internationally interconnected and mutually supportive."

He is also closely watching Europe's recent rise of Offshore Hybrid Assets—internationally coordinated projects in which floating offshore wind farms are constructed in shared waters and connected to neighboring countries via subsea cables. "Taiwan is a regional leader in offshore wind development. We could spearhead cooperative projects in surrounding waters near Japan and the Philippines, building offshore wind farms paired with transmission cables across borders."

Wu sees these new technologies and emerging market structures as decisive opportunities for Taiwan. "This requires medium- to long-term planning—roughly ten to thirty years. But it also represents Taiwan's best opening in the region's shifting geopolitical landscape."

A concept he repeatedly emphasizes is what he calls "energy diplomacy."

"Europe is leveraging green energy to combat climate change, break through geopolitical constraints, and build renewable industries suited to its own strengths. The United States has regained global strategic leverage by aggressively developing domestic fossil fuels. Taiwan must rethink and integrate its renewable-energy and cross-border subsea-cable strategies to support a new energy diplomacy of our own."

"Energy itself is diplomacy," Wu asserted. He cited Singapore's recent moves, noting that the government has already approved and fully mobilized efforts to develop multiple subsea-cable projects with neighboring countries. This not only secures Singapore's power supply but also cements its role as Southeast Asia's electricity hub. As Asia's Super Grid begins to take shape—connecting Northeast Asia with Southeast Asia—Taiwan sits at the center of that strategic map, and, as a major demand market, holds undeniable significance.

With a forward-looking tone, he added: "Energy will become a pillar of future international diplomacy. And because Taiwan possesses world-leading semiconductor manufacturing—an industry whose energy demand will only grow—early planning and participation will allow us to hold greater influence in regional integration discussions."

Accelerating the Energy Transition to Support Long-Term Industrial Growth

Yet Wu is fully aware that if Taiwan is to exert real influence in this emerging strategic domain, it must move beyond the traditional notion of pursuing "full end-to-end localization." Instead, he argues, Taiwan must clearly distinguish between the goals and the process of industrial development—and accelerate its energy transition accordingly.

"Offshore wind, subsea cable equipment, and marine engineering all have extremely high entry barriers, long development cycles, and massive capital requirements," Wu noted. "Global supply availability is tight. If Taiwan insists on full domestic manufacturing, we may end up delaying schedules and increasing risks."

The key question, he said, is one of long-term competitiveness: "Are these sectors ones in which Taiwan can realistically sustain long-term development? Can we be competitive internationally? Or are these industries merely steps in the process? The real objective is to generate green electricity to support industries where Taiwan truly can compete on the global stage."

Wu advocates for a model of "strategic localization"—retaining domestically the components critical to national security and system resilience, while integrating the rest with mature international supply chains to ensure quality and bankability.

"Energy transition is ultimately a race for speed and stability," he emphasized. "It is not a contest to see how localized the supply chain can become."

Fast, Stable, Precise — A New Governance Model for Taiwan's Energy Future

Wu distills Taiwan's future energy strategy into a concise "governance roadmap" built on four pillars: speed, stability, precision, and economic viability.

"Speed" means that reforms and infrastructure deployment must keep pace with the needs of industry.

"Stability" requires governance and policy frameworks that are predictable over the long term.

"Precision" refers to diversification—of risks, power sources, geographic distribution, and transmission routes.

And "economic viability" means policies must earn the trust of investors and industry participants.

Energy, he stressed, is not a secondary condition but an integral part of national power. If Taiwan can position energy at the intersection of diplomacy, technology, and security, it will be able to redefine its place in this new era.

"The future of energy isn't about who generates the most," Wu emphasized. "It's about who thinks the farthest ahead."