EnergyOMNI's Perspectives｜Offshore Wind Farms And National Security, Can We Have It Both?

Edited by EnergyOMNI

In the past year, the Trump administration has proposed freezing multiple offshore wind projects under construction in the United States, citing "national security risks." The engineering organization Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) recently published an article in IEEE Spectrum, interviewing several military experts to examine the relationship between offshore wind power and national defense.

The article notes that the administration's actions have led the public to believe that the trade-off between offshore wind and national defense is a recent issue. In reality, many European countries have been mitigating the security impacts of wind turbines for more than a decade, and some have even begun integrating wind farms into their defense systems.

How can interference with radar systems be reduced?

Wind turbines interfere with radar primarily because of their large size, which reflects radar signals. Rotating blades create a Doppler effect that alters the reflected wavelength, causing radar systems to misidentify them as moving objects. In addition, according to a 2024 report by the U.S. Department of Energy, turbines can scatter radar signals, potentially obscuring aircraft, missiles, and drones, or preventing older line-of-sight radar systems from detecting targets behind them.

Regarding concerns that offshore wind farms may reduce the effectiveness of radar surveillance systems and seabed sensors, retired Dutch Navy lieutenant admiral Ben Bekkering, also a member of the International Military Council on Climate and Security, said that solutions already exist. These include next-generation radar technologies, radar-absorbing coatings on turbine blades, and multimodal sensor systems that can transform wind farm safety infrastructure into forward defense assets.

Currently, the most common approach is upgrading radar systems. For example, using software algorithms to recognize turbine radar signatures and reduce false alarms. Careful site selection is also critical. When planning offshore wind zones in the Atlantic, the U.S. government recently reduced one potential site off Maryland coast by 79% to minimize defense impacts.

Experts note that further hardware upgrades can better address radar interference. New solid-state, phased-array radar systems can distinguish turbines from other objects more effectively than traditional mechanical radar. By adjusting the timing of hundreds or even thousands of radio waves, phased arrays create interference patterns that control the radar beam, providing higher resolution, improved multi-target tracking, and better detection behind obstacles. According to Danish naval commander Tue Lippert, most modern radar systems are already capable of "seeing through" wind farms.

At the early stage of reforming the civil aviation air traffic system, the Trump administration also procured phased-array radar and related equipment from Collins Aerospace, which highlights wind farm interference mitigation as a key feature of its products.

Can wind farms support military surveillance?

Another way to reduce radar blind spots is by installing "infill radar" to cover gaps created by wind farms. This can involve adding radar systems on land to observe from new angles or installing radar directly on turbines to extend detection range. In fact, wind farms are increasingly being used to expand military surveillance capabilities. As Tue Lippert noted, "If used properly, it can become a tactical advantage."

In 2021, Swedish defense contractor Saab and Danish wind developer Ørsted tested the installation of air-defense radar within a wind farm. Saab conducted a two-month trial of its Giraffe 1X radar at the Hornsea 1 wind farm, located about 120 kilometers off the coast of Yorkshire, England. The test aimed to reduce interference with existing air and maritime environments and to validate performance in coastal and offshore conditions, including extreme weather and high wind speeds.

GIRAFFE 1X reportedly combines multi-tasking capabilities and multi-role use, enabling it to track up to 600 airborne and other types of targets simultaneously. The system also offers enhanced detection of low, slow, and small flying targets. It can extend situational awareness beyond the horizon of ground-based long-range radar. Saab stated in its release that a standardized approach will be developed to ensure the long-term coexistence of defense and offshore wind energy. The UK Ministry of Defence has procured 11 Giraffe 1X radar systems.

Examples of wind farms supporting military surveillance

Many offshore wind farms are already equipped with marine radar on turbines to track maintenance vessels and detect unauthorized ships entering wind farm areas. If such signals or systems are shared with defense authorities, they could provide a more comprehensive picture of maritime activity around turbines and help detect low-flying cruise missiles that can evade traditional air-defense radar.

Sharing signals and infrastructure is part of Europe's broader push for "dual-use" offshore infrastructure. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Poland have begun deploying expanded dual-use sensor systems. This approach is also one of the recommendations from the "Symbiosis Project" led by the European Defence Agency.

Poland has gone further by requiring all offshore wind farms to include defense-related equipment. Its first project, Baltic Power, located about 200 kilometers south of Russia's Kaliningrad exclave and expected to begin operation in 2026, has already been equipped with radar and sensors designated by the Ministry of Defence.

The United Kingdom is conducting similar experiments. In December 2025, aerospace company LiveLink Aerospace, based in West Sussex, demonstrated dual-use sensors installed on multiple turbines at a Vattenfall wind farm off Aberdeen, Scotland. These sensors integrate electro-optical systems, thermal imaging, visible-light cameras, and radio-frequency and acoustic detectors, enabling LiveLink's passive radar solution to provide real-time situational awareness and advanced threat identification.

Wind developers shift toward cooperation with defense authorities

In the past, wind farm developers were often reluctant to cooperate with the military, fearing that wind farms could become military targets and preferring to maintain their civilian character. Meanwhile, the military was also hesitant to share equipment, as it is accustomed to maintaining full control over its systems.

However, this mindset is changing as Russia becomes increasingly assertive. Tobhias Wikström, CEO of Swedish consultancy Parachute Consulting and a former Swedish Air Force lieutenant colonel, noted that Russia's attacks on Ukraine's power grid demonstrate that anything can become a target. Recent incidents involving damage to subsea gas pipelines and cables have further underscored the need for cooperation between offshore wind operators and defense authorities.

Giles Dickson, CEO of WindEurope, stated that threats to offshore energy infrastructure are real—not only cyberattacks but also physical sabotage. The Baltic Sea has seen multiple cable attack incidents. In response to this new reality, WindEurope has hired former military personnel to maintain liaison with NATO.

Wind farms and national security: we need both

At the end of 2024, Sweden's Ministry of Defence rejected 13 offshore wind projects in the Baltic Sea facing Russia, citing national security concerns. The government argued that wind turbines could interfere with military operations and weaken the ability to detect incoming missiles, leading to "unacceptable consequences" for defense.

However, Saab's CEO publicly disputed this claim, stating that its radar systems "can handle" wind farms. Former Air Force lieutenant colonel Wikström also questioned the government's position. He pointed out that since Sweden joined NATO in 2024, it has gained access to air-defense radar data from countries such as Finland, Germany, and Poland, forming a comprehensive surveillance network over the Baltic Sea.

Danish naval commander Tue Lippert argued that countries like Sweden and the United States risk missing opportunities for training and adaptation if they choose to ban offshore wind instead of learning how to operate in such environments. Drawing on his experience as a reserve liaison officer with Denmark's Joint Arctic Command in Greenland and frequent cooperation with U.S. forces, he noted that offshore wind farms are widespread along the coasts of China and Taiwan. If U.S. naval and air forces are not accustomed to operating in wind farm-dense coastal environments, they could face significant disadvantages in real conflict scenarios.

The American Clean Power Association has made a similar argument, suggesting that given China's extensive offshore wind deployment, U.S. forces could train around domestic wind farms to prepare for various operational scenarios.

Retired Dutch Navy lieutenant admiral Ben Bekkering concluded: "It's not a choice between wind farms and national security—we need both."