EnergyOMNI's Perspectives｜National Security Firm Warns of National Security Risks Posed by Philippines-China Offshore Wind MOU

Edited by EnergyOMNI

The Buhawind offshore wind project, a joint venture between Philippine company PetroGreen Energy Corp. (PGEC) and Danish company Copenhagen Energy, announced in November 2025 that it had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Chinese wind turbine manufacturer Mingyang Smart Energy.

Under the agreement, the two parties will assess whether the local offshore meteorological and marine conditions at Buhawind's 2 GW Northern Luzon wind farm are suitable for Mingyang's turbine technology. The study will also evaluate power generation and costs, develop engineering designs tailored to local infrastructure conditions, and formulate full life-cycle operations and maintenance (O&M) service plans.

However, British defence and national security intelligence company Janes has warned that the potential national security implications of the partnership for the Philippines warrant close attention. Because critical infrastructure such as energy projects is highly sensitive, many governments take a cautious approach to allowing foreign companies to participate in its development. In August 2025, the German Waterkant offshore wind project cancelled its planned procurement of Mingyang turbines after the German government determined that the use of Chinese-made turbines could pose cybersecurity and national security risks.

Similarly, in March 2026, the UK government blocked Mingyang's proposed investment in a wind turbine manufacturing facility in the Scottish Highlands on national security grounds. In addition to concerns that Chinese-made turbines could potentially be used to monitor UK territorial waters, submarine programmes and energy infrastructure, the UK government also expressed concerns about growing dependence on Chinese equipment, software and maintenance services.

The Buhawind project comprises three offshore wind farms, all of which will use floating wind technology, with a combined planned capacity of 4 GW. They are Northern Luzon (2 GW), located in Northern Luzon; Northern Mindoro (1 GW); and East Panay (1 GW). Of these, the project being developed in cooperation with Mingyang is located in Northern Luzon. Approximately 200 km from Taiwan, Northern Luzon is also a strategically important location for the United States, as it hosts key U.S.-deployed missile systems. The region is strategically significant not only for the Philippines in asserting its claims in the South China Sea, but also for its ally, the United States.

According to Janes' analysis, offshore wind turbines can exceed 100 metres in height, making them potentially suitable platforms for surveillance equipment capable of monitoring critical infrastructure as well as the movements of personnel and vessels. Janes therefore warns that Mingyang's activities in Northern Luzon could potentially provide China with intelligence on strategic vulnerabilities involving both the Philippines and the United States.

Although the MOU currently covers only a feasibility study, Janes points out that such studies typically involve [geographic surveying] of the relevant area, which could provide Mingyang with information on local seabed topography and nearby coastlines. Identifying ports around Northern Luzon suitable for Mingyang's future O&M activities could also provide detailed information on ports and related infrastructure. While such information has clear commercial value for the future construction and operation of the wind farm, it may also have potential intelligence and national security value and therefore should not be overlooked.

The Philippine government is expected to hold its offshore wind auction, the fifth Green Energy Auction (GEA-5), this year. The auction is expected to procure 3.3 GW of offshore wind capacity, with projects scheduled for completion between 2028 and 2030. Following the auction, more offshore wind development activities are likely to take place in Philippine waters, and awarded projects may also engage Chinese suppliers for components or services. At a time when tensions between the Philippines and China over competing sovereignty claims in the South China Sea are intensifying, the Philippines should exercise greater caution regarding the potential national security risks associated with the participation of Chinese companies in the country's offshore wind development.